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I. 
OBJECTIONS TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant Perry D. Odak ("Mr. Odak") objects to Appellee 
Peggy B. Odak's ("Mrs. Odak") statement of the case in the 
following respects. 
1. Mrs. Odak asserts that in a conference call with the 
court the day prior to the hearing that counsel and the court 
agreed that the matter could be presented to the court by way of 
proffers of testimony. [Appellee's Brief, p. 2]. In fact, the 
agreement was that the parties would proffer the evidence they 
intended to present and then the court would determine if it wanted 
to hear any evidence before ruling on the motions before the court. 
[R. 409]. 
2. Mrs. Odak states the only persons present in the 
courtroom at the hearing that could have been called as witnesses 
to testify were the parties themselves. This statement is 
misleading. In fact, a number of depositions had been taken of 
witnesses located in Ohio. [R. 414 and 424]. 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
A. MR. ODAK DID NOT STIPULATE OR AGREE THAT THE COURT 
COULD MAKE EVIDENTIARY FINDINGS WITHOUT TAKING EVIDENCE. 
Mrs. Odak argues that because at the hearing Mr. Odak did 
not specifically request that the court hear evidence before 
issuing its ruling, Mr. Odak consented to the manner in which the 
proceedings were handled by the court and cannot complain about the 
court's failure to take evidence before making an evidentiary 
ruling. It is respectfully submitted that this argument is without 
merit. 
Mrs. Odak glosses over the fact that the court prior to the 
hearing had already determined that it would proceed by taking 
proffers of testimony and then the court would determine if it 
wanted to hear evidence before ruling. The court was entitled in 
its discretion to proceed in that fashion. After hearing the 
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proffers, the court could have determined to rule on the contempt 
motion in such a manner that the court would not need to resolve 
disputed issues of fact. In that event, there was no need to hear 
evidence. For example, if the proffers demonstrated as a matter of 
law that Mrs. Odak had denigrated Mr. Odak, the court could have so 
ruled as a matter of law without hearing any evidence. The problem 
is that the court did not rule on the contempt motion as a matter 
of law. The court ruled by purporting to make an evidentiary 
finding that Mr. Odak had failed to prove defamation by a 
preponderance of the evidence without taking any evidence. This 
was clear error. 
The only case cited by Mrs. Odak to attempt to support her 
position is not on point. In Jenkins v. Weis, 868 P.2d 1374 (Utah 
App. 1994), the defendant made a motion for a directed verdict 
orally after presentation of the plaintiff's evidence. Plaintiff 
contended that he was entitled to prior notice and a hearing. The 
court stated that motions for directed verdicts are typically made 
orally during trial, that plaintiff received the usual notice for 
the motion and hearing and that in any event the plaintiff had not 
objected. In the present case, Mr. Odak had no way of knowing 
prior to the time the court actually issued its ruling that the 
court would improperly include in its ruling findings on a disputed 
factual issue without taking evidence. 
Mr. Odak's proffer of evidence was clearly sufficient to 
demonstrate Mrs. Odak had violated the divorce decree by 
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denigrating and defaming him. It was clear, palpable error for the 
court to decide to the contrary. 
B. THE COURT ERRED IN REQUIRING PROOF OF DEFAMATION RATHER 
THAN DENIGRATION. 
The divorce decree prohibited the parties from denigrating 
each other. One of the meanings of the word denigration is to 
defame a person. But denigration has a broader meaning that 
defamation, including "to cast aspersions on, defame . . . or 
belittle." [Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1989)]. It 
was therefore error for the court in its ruling to implicitly 
require that Mr. Odak prove the tort of defamation. 
Mrs. Odak argues that the court's ruling was justified 
because at the hearing Mr. Odak's counsel used the term 
"defamation" in arguing the matter. The fact that Mr. Odak's 
counsel stated that Mrs. Odak had defamed Mr. Odak does not in any 
way change the relevant provision of the divorce decree or what Mr. 
Odak was required to prove in order to show the decree was 
violated. Moreover, Mrs. Odak does not fairly characterize 
counsel's argument. 
Mr. Odak's counsel clearly argued that the divorce decree 
prohibited Mrs. Odak from denigrating Mr. Odak: 
Paragraph 13 of the Divorce Decree stated that 
the parties shall "not in any way denigrate each 
other, publicly or privately, so as to negatively 
affect each other's personal, professional or business 
relations, harm each other's professional reputations, 
or reduce each other's earning power." This provision 
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wasn't in the Divorce Decree just for the fun of it. 
It was in there because my client, for many years, has 
been a top executive of a number of important, 
substantial companies. It was obviously important 
that his reputation remain the best it could be, and 
that it not be denigrated by Mrs. Odak, and the 
parties not engage in that type of name calling. . . 
The depositions that we took demonstrate very 
clearly that this provision has been violated by Mrs. 
Odak. . . . 
Judge, we would like there to be peace in the 
valley at the end of this process. It is very 
important that this provisions of the Divorce Decree 
be honored. It is very important to us that Mrs. Odak 
be required to stop making derogatory statements 
against Mr. Odak. . . . That's what we are asking for 
the court to do. Thank you. [R. 424-25] .1 
Mrs. Odak does not deny that Mr. Odak's proffer of evidence 
was plainly sufficient to show denigration. How could Mrs. Odak 
possibly argue that her statements to third parties that Mr. Odak 
is conniving and devious, pays of judges and witnesses, is 
vindictive, evil and dangerous, is capable of having people beat up 
or injured, and that he was probably behind threats of physical 
violence to her did not constitute denigration? 
C. MRS. ODAK IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
Finally, Mrs. Odak argues that in the event this Court were 
to affirm the district court's order, she should be awarded her 
attorney's fees. Mrs. Odak erroneously tells the Court in this 
regard that she was rewarded her attorney's fees below. 
1
 Mr. Odak's counsel further stated that " . . . the Divorce 
Decree says you don't make derogatory comments. You don't 
denigrate" [R. 431] and that Mrs. Odak should "stop bad-mouthing 
Perry." [R. 432]. 
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Mr. Odak believes very strongly for all of the reasons 
stated above that the district court's order should be reversed. 
However, even if this court decides not to reverse the order, Mrs. 
Odak is not entitled to her attorney's fees incurred on appeal. 
Mrs. Odak was not, in fact, awarded her attorney's fees below. 
Judge Brian ordered that in the event Mr. Odak paid the outstanding 
judgments for spousal support no later than December 1, 1997 that 
each party was to pay his or her own legal fees and costs. It is 
undisputed that Mr. Odak did, in fact, pay the outstanding 
judgments before December 1, 1997. Thus, Mrs. Odak was not awarded 
her attorney's fees. Moreover, the conditional award of $10,000.00 
in the event Mr. Odak did not pay the judgments related to the 
motions directed to spousal support, not Mr. Odak's contempt 
motion. [R. 455]. There is no basis for awarding any attorney's 
fees on appeal.2 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted 
that the district court's order should be reversed with respect to 
the finding of no defamation and the case remanded for an 
2
 Management Services v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d 406 
(Utah 1980), cited by Mrs. Odak, is clearly distinguishable. In 
that case, the Utah Supreme Court merely held that it would adopt 
the rule that if a party was entitled to recover attorney's fees by 
contract the court would enforce that contractual provision by 
awarding fees on appeal. 
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evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether Mrs. Odak denigrated 
Mr. Odak in violation of the decree of divorce. In the 
alternative, the finding should be set aside. 
DATED this fj --day of September, 1998. 
BURBIDGE Sc MITCHELL 
js odak\appeal\brief-2 
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